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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
vs. 
GORDON R. KING, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Case No. 20040727-SC 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
* * * 
ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State submits this brief 
in reply to the new matters raised in respondent's brief. 
A. THE ADEQUACY OF VOIR DIRE TURNS ON WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT 
AFFORDED COUNSEL AN OPPORTUNITY TO ELICIT RELEVANT 
INFORMATION. 
Even though defense counsel told the trial court that the juror questioning was 
sufficient and passed jurors 2F and 181 for cause, defendant argues that the court of appeals 
correctly applied an abuse of discretion standard to the trial court's failure to further question 
the two jurors or remove them. See Resp. Brf. at 8-14.l According to defendant, the trial 
court cannot rely on the representations of counsel regarding voir dire because "the burden to 
On direct appeal, defendant acknowledged that because the jurors were not 
challenged at trial below, he was required to show plain error or ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Aplt. Brf. at 1. 
conduct careful voir dire [falls] squarely on the shoulders of the trial courts." Aplt. Brf. at 9, 
16. In a nutshell, defendant claims that an abuse of discretion standard is appropriate 
because the burden of conducting a careful voir dire is the exclusive responsibility of the trial 
court. This claim lacks merit. 
It is true that "it is [the trial judge's] duty to see that the constitutional rights of an 
accused to an impartial jury is safeguarded." State v. Dixon, 560 P.2d 318,319 (Utah 1977). 
It is likewise true that "[v]oir dire questioning is essential to choosing [that] impartial jury 
...." State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59,^33,992 P.2d 951. However, the responsibility for the 
content and scope of the voir dire examination rests primarily with trial counsel. It is 
counsel who is in the best position to know which biases to explore because "only counsel 
will, at the beginning, have a clear overview of the entire case and the type of evidence likely 
to be adduced." State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 845 (Utah 1988). Thus, under Utah law, 
the trial court "may permit counsel or the defendant to conduct the [voir dire] examination of 
the prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination." Utah R. Crim. P. 18(b). But 
if the court conducts the examination, it must give counsel an opportunity to ask or submit 
questions. Utah R. Crim. P. 18(b). 
The trial court "ha[s] some discretion in limiting voir dire inquiry." Saunders, 1999 
UT 59, f 43. But this Court has held that "that discretion must be 'liberally exercised' in 
favor of allowing counsel to elicit necessary information for ferreting out bias, whether for a 
for-cause or a peremptory challenge." Id. at Tf 34 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). In 
doing so, the trial court helps safeguard an accused's right to an impartial jury. See Dixon, 
2 
560 P.2d at 319. Accordingly, this Court has consistently defined the trial judge's voir dire 
obligation in terms of what questioning the trial court "allows" counsel to present. 
In support of his claim that the trial court's voir dire was inadequate, defendant cites 
State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1984), State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839 (Utah 1988), State 
v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988), overruled on other grounds by State v. Menzies, 889 
P.2d 393 (Utah 1994),2 and State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 798 (Utah 1991).. See Resp. Brf. 
at 9-10,16. But these cases do not support that proposition. To the contrary, they hold that a 
trial court's voir dire examination will be insufficient only if the trial court does not "allow[ ] 
counsel to elicit [relevant] information from prospective jurors." Worthen, 765 P.2d at 845. 
In Ball, the Court explained that "a party must be allowed to gather sufficient relevant 
information during voir dire" so he or she can make informed decisions when challenging 
prospective jurors. 685 P.2d at 1060 (emphasis added). The Court "h[e]ld that the failure of 
the [trial] court to permit counsel's inquiry was . . . error . . . . " Id. 
In Bishop, the Court held that "whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
conducting voir dire turns on whether, considering the totality of the questioning, counsel 
was afforded an adequate opportunity to gain the information necessary to evaluate jurors." 
753 P.2d at 448 (emphases added). The Court rejected Bishop's claims of inadequate voir 
dire because he had "not . . . established] that the court's interruptions and questioning 
Menzies overruled the automatic reversal rule applied in Bishop, which required 
reversal whenever a party was compelled to exercise a peremptory challenge on a 
prospective juror who should have been removed for cause, but was not. 889 P.2d at 397-98. 
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[during counsel's questioning of the prospective jurors] deprived him of the opportunity to 
discover information relevant to [the juror's] fitness for jury service." Id. (emphasis added). 
In Worthen, the Court explained that "[although a trial judge has some discretion in 
limiting voir dire examinations, that discretion should be liberally exercised in favor of 
allowing counsel to elicit information from prospective jurors." 765 P. 2d at 845 (emphasis 
added). Continuing, the Court held that "the fairness of a trial may depend on the right of 
counsel to ask voir dire questions designed to discover attitudes and biases, both conscious 
and subconscious,...." Id. (emphasis added). The Court ultimately rejected Worthen's 
claim because "[t]he record simply [did] not demonstrate that the trial judge prevented 
counsel from exploring certain topics." Id. 
In James, the Court reiterated that the trial court's discretion to limit voir dire 
"'should be liberally exercised in favor of allowing counsel to elicit information from 
prospective jurors.'" 819 P.2d at 798 (quoting Worthen, 765 P.2d at 845) (emphasis added). 
The Court explained that "trial courts can and should conduct voir dire proceedings in a way 
which not only meets constitutional requirements, but also enables litigants and their 
counsel to intelligently exercise peremptory challenges and which attempts, as much as 
possible, to eliminate bias and prejudice from the trial proceedings." Id. (emphasis added). 
Other cases have likewise so held. As noted, this Court in Saunders held that 
"effective voir dire questioning of prospective jurors must not be prevented " 1999 UT 
59, \ 34. The Court explained that a judge's discretion is broad when counsel's proposed 
questions "have no apparent link to any potential bias," but "narrows" when the proposed 
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questions "have some possible link to possible bias." Saunders, 1999 UT 59, f 43. And 
"when proposed voir dire questions go directly to the existence of an actual bias, that 
discretion disappears. The trial court must allow such inquiries." Id. And in State v. Wach, 
2001 UT 35, f 42,24 P.3d 948, the Court rejected a claim that possibly biased jurors should 
have been excused for cause because the defendant "failed to demonstrate that he was not 
afforded an adequate opportunity to gain the information necessary to evaluate [the] jurors 
. . . ." (emphasis added). 
Defendant here has not alleged that he was prevented from eliciting more information 
from jurors 2F and 181. See Resp. Brf. Nor could he. After juror 8H was called for 
additional questioning, the trial judge said, "I think we have probably talked to everyone else 
who raised their hand." R. 109:50. Defense counsel agreed, replying, "I think so." R. 109: 
50. Then, after questioning juror 8H, the judged asked, "[D]o both sides pass the jury for 
cause with those strikes noted?" R. 109: 53. Counsel responded, "Yes, your Honor." R. 
109: 53. Not once did counsel ask that jurors 2F and 181 be questioned further. 
Therefore, as in Worthen, "[t]he difficulty in this case is that the defendant has not 
demonstrated that he was prevented from asking proper questions." Worthen, 765 P.2d at 
839. Despite given the opportunity to do so, he declined. "The record simply does not 
demonstrate that the trial judge prevented counsel from exploring certain topics," i.e., the 
details of the two jurors' first- or second-hand experience with abuse. Where the trial court 
did not limit the voir dire examination, there can be no claim that it abused its discretion. 
Therefore, its failure to ask additional questions can only be reviewed for plain error. See 
5 
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, fflf 7-8, 12 P.3d 92; State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 333-34 
(Utah 1993); see also Pet. Brf. at 10-15. 
B. THE JURORS' ASSURANCES THAT THEY COULD BE FAIR WERE 
SUFFICIENT TO REBUT ANY INFERENCE OF BIAS. 
Defendant argues that jurors 2F and 181 were "presumptively biased" and that the 
inference of bias was not rebutted. See Resp. Brf. at 13-14. He claims that the jurors' 
assurances that they could be impartial notwithstanding their first- or second-hand 
experience with abuse were insufficient to rebut the inference. Resp. Brf. at 13. However, 
defendant cites no authority in support of this claim. An examination of the relevant case 
law reveals that any inference of bias was sufficiently rebutted by their assurance of 
impartiality. 
It is true that when a potentially biased juror is challenged for cause, the juror's 
statement alone that she can be fair and impartial is usually insufficient to rebut the inference 
of bias. See Jenkins, 627 P.2d at 536. However, when the juror's assurance is not 
challenged by counsel, the trial court can properly rely on that assurance. In Saunders, this 
Court explained: 
[A] juror's statement alone that he or she can decide a case fairly pursuant to 
the law given by the trial court is not a sufficient basis for qualifying a juror 
when [1] the prospective juror's answers provide evidence of possible bias and 
[2] the trial court does not allow further questions designed to probe the extent 
and depth of the bias. 
Saunders, 1999 UT 59, f 36 (emphasis added). When both conditions are present, the 
assurance is not satisfactory. However, when only one condition is present, the assurance is 
sufficient. As discussed, the trial court below did not prevent counsel from asking further 
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questions. Counsel agreed that all those who needed to be questioned had been questioned 
and passed the two jurors for cause. Because the trial court allowed further questioning, the 
jurors' assurances were sufficient to rebut any inference of bias. 
C. THE REMOVE-OR-REHABILITATE RULE APPLIES ONLY WHEN A 
CHALLENGE IS MADE TO A POTENTIALLY BIASED JUROR, 
Defendant also relies on State v. Wooley, 810 P.2d 440 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 826 
P.2d 651 (Utah 1991), for the proposition that a trial court abuses its discretion if it does not 
remove a potentially biased juror or rehabilitate the juror through further inquiry. Resp. Brf. 
at 11. Wooley, in turn, relied on this Court's decision in State v. Cobb, 11A P.2d 1123 (Utah 
1989). In Cobb, the Court articulated a "remove-or-rehabilitate" rule: "When comments are 
made which facially question a prospective juror's impartiality or prejudice, an abuse of 
discretion may occur unless the challenged juror is removed by the court or unless the court 
or counsel investigates and finds the inference rebutted." Id. at 1126. 
As explained in the State's opening brief, this abuse of discretion standard applies 
only where the juror is "challenged" by counsel. See Pet. Brf. at 10-15. Otherwise, the 
Court will review the claim on appeal only upon a showing of plain error or ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Cobb is a case on point. 
On appeal, Cobb claimed that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss two prospective 
jurors for cause: Joyce Lloyd, because of her prior acquaintance with the prosecuting 
attorney, and Jesse Holden, because he stated during voir dire that "he had 'very, very strong 
feelings about the taking of human life.'" Cobb, 11A P.2d at 1125-26. This Court examined 
the voir dire inquiry of Ms. Lloyd under the remove-or-rehabilitate rule and concluded that 
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the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to dismiss her. Id. at 1226. However, 
the Court held that it was precluded from reviewing Cobb's claim that Mr. Holden was 
biased because of his strong feelings about the taking of human life. The Court observed 
that "defendant did not raise this claim [of bias] below," but challenged Mr. Holden on other 
grounds. Id. After observing that "the grounds for an objection must be specifically and 
distinctly stated," the Court held that "[fjailure to meet these requirements precludes review 
of defendant's claim [of juror bias] on appeal." Id. 
Under Cobb, therefore, this Court will not review for an abuse of discretion a trial 
court's failure to remove or rehabilitate a potentially biased juror if 1 here is no specific 
challenge to that juror. In that case, a claim of juror bias raised for the first time on appeal 
can be made only upon a showing of plain error. See Litherland,, 2000 UT 76, ^ 7-8; 
Olsen, 860 P.2d at 333-34. 
D. SOUND POLICY SUPPORTS APPLICATION OF THE REMOVE-OR-
REHABILITATE RULE ONLY WHEN A POTENTIALLY BIASED JUROR IS 
CHALLENGED DURING VOIR DIRE AND THE SHOWING OF ACTUAL BIAS 
WHEN NO CHALLENGE IS MADE TO THE JUROR. 
Sound policy supports application of the remove-or-rehabilitate rule only when a 
potentially biased juror is challenged during the voir dire examination. During jury 
selection, "it is a simple matter to obviate any problem of bias simply by excusing the 
prospective juror and selecting another." Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533,536 (Utah 1981). 
3
 The Court then "considered] arguendo" the merits of Cobb's claim that Mr. Holden 
was biased under the remove-or-rehabilitate" rule and concluded that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in refusing to dismiss him for cause. Cobb, 11A P.2d at 1126-28. 
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ADMITTEDLY BIASED JURORS 
Could not be fair because of her 
experience as a former DCFS 
worker 
Could not be fair because she 
and a family member had been 
victims of abuse 
/ Juror \ 
I Juror \ 
Could not be fair because her 
son had been the victim of 
sexual abuse 
Could not be fair because she 
had some experience with sexual 
abuse 
PROFESSED IMPARTIAL JURORS 
Subject to Wooley's 
Remove-or-Rehabilitate 
Requirement 
Could be fair even though he 
had some experience with abuse 
Could be fair even though she 
had some experience with abuse 
Could be fair even though she 
had some experience with abuse 
Could be fair even though had 
some experience with abuse 
-Defense Did Not Request -
Additional Questioning 
/ Juror \ I Juror \ 
Could be fair even though had 
some experience with abuse 
Removed for Cause 
Passed for Cause 
Accordingly, this Court has emphasized that "trial judges should err on the side of caution in 
ruling on for-cause challenges and that the scope of judicial discretion accorded a trial judge 
must be evaluated in light of the ease with which all issues of bias can be dispensed by the 
simple expedient of replacing a questionable juror with another whose neutrality is not open 
to question." Saunders, 1999 UT 59, \ 51. 
On the other hand, when a timely challenge to a potentially biased juror is not made 
and the juror is passed for cause, it is no longer "a simple matter to obviate any problem of 
bias simply by excusing the prospective juror and selecting another." Jenkins, 627 P.2d at 
536 (Utah 1981). The jury has been selected, the remaining venire panel has been excused, 
and the possibly biased juror can no longer be replaced. And when the claim of juror bias is 
first raised on appeal, the evidence has been presented, the jury has rendered a verdict of 
guilty, and the defendant has been sentenced. Under these circumstances, it would not be 
sound policy to require a new trial based on the "possibility" a juror was biased. 
Indeed, our courts have almost universally required a showing of actual bias before 
disturbing a jury verdict based on possible juror bias. The United States Supreme Court has 
concluded that "due process does not require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in 
a potentially compromising position." Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217, 102 S.Ct. 940, 
946 (1982). With perhaps a few exceptions, infra, a new trial is appropriate only upon a 
showing of actual bias. Id. at 215-17, 102 S.Ct. at 945-446. Accordingly, the Supreme 
Court "has long held that the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which 
the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias." Id. at 215, 102 S.Ct. at 945. 
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As discussed, requiring the removal of a potentially biased juror during the jury 
selection process is sound policy because any concern of bias "can be dispensed by the 
simple expedient of replacing a questionable juror with another whose neutrality is not open 
to question." Saunders, 1999 UT 59, f 51. And as discussed, such is not the case with a 
prospective juror who survived the selection process, passed for cause, and served on the 
jury. In that case, this Court has held that defendant must establish actual bias. See Menzies, 
889 P.2d at 398 (holding that "[t]o prevail on a claim of error based on the failure to remove 
a juror for cause, a defendant must demonstrate prejudice, viz., show that a member of the 
jury was partial or incompetent"). The court of appeals below acknowledged that such a 
showing has not been made. See State v. King, 2004 UT App 210, K 18, 95 P.3d 282. 
But citing State v. Pike, 712P.2d277 (Utah 1985), defendant argues that a conviction 
may be reversed "solely because it appears that the right to an impartial jury has been 
jeopardized." Resp. Brf. at 11. Pike is inapposite. 
In Pike, the arresting officer, who was also a witness at the scene of the altercation, 
spoke to three jurors during a trial recess about an injury he suffered at home. Pike, 712 P.2d 
at 279-80. When the trial court learned of the conversation, it questioned the officer about 
the encounter. Id. "The judge and counsel agreed to let the incident go until after the verdict 
was in and then to question the jurors involved in the conversation." Id. at 279 After the 
trial, the court questioned the jurors and determined that the conversation was innocuous. Id. 
The trial court denied Pike's subsequent motion for a new trial. Id. 
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In reversing, this Court observed that "[a]nything more than the most incidental 
contact during the trial between witnesses and jurors casts doubt upon the impartiality of the 
jury and at best gives the appearance of the absence of impartiality." Id. at 279-80. The 
Court determined that "the conversation amounted to more than a brief, incidental contact," 
that it "no doubt had the effect of breeding a sense of familiarity that could clearly affect the 
jurors judgment as to credibility," and that as such, it created a presumption of bias. Id. at 
281. The Court concluded that any denial by the jurors that they were influenced by the 
encounter would not be sufficient to rebut the presumption of bias. Id. The Court so 
concluded because the contact created "the appearance of impropriety" and actual prejudice 
was "not provable." Id. at 280. 
This case is unlike Pike. First, there is no "appearance of impropriety" on the part of 
the prosecution, as in Pike. And second, unlike jurors who have more than incidental contact 
with a key prosecution witness, impartiality can be established for jurors who have some 
unknown first- or second-hand experience with sexual abuse. This case proves the point. 
Like jurors 2F and 181, jurors 8H, 20 J, and 28K had some ambiguous experience with 
sexual abuse. All three assured the court that they could be fair and impartial 
notwithstanding that experience. Further questioning revealed the extent of that experience 
and provided a basis for assessing the jurors' ability to judge impartially. Juror 8H's wife 
had been sexually abused as a child before he met her. R. 109: 51-53. Juror 20J had been 
the victim of sexual abuse as a teenager and her niece had been sexually abused four years 
earlier. R. 109: 35-38. Juror 28K's uncle had been accused of sexually abusing juror 28K's 
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seven-year-old cousin. R. 109: 42-44. The inference of bias in jurors 8H and 28K was 
rebutted and both passed for cause. See R. 109: 44, 53. It was not rebutted with respect to 
juror 20J and she was dismissed for cause. R. 109: 45. 
In sum, the trial court's questioning of the three jurors enabled it to assess their ability 
to set aside their experiences and judge defendant impartially. Likewise, the ability of jurors 
2F and 181 could be assessed in a post-trial hearing through questions similar to those 
presented to jurors 8H, 20J, and 28K. Defendant contends that such a hearing would violate 
rule 606(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. Resp. Brf. at 14. That rule, however, only prohibits a 
juror from testifying "as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's 
deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as 
influencing the juror's mental processes in connection therewith ...." Utah R. Evid. 606(b). 
No such an inquiry need be made. Questioning that revealed the nature and scope of the 
jurors' experience, as presented to jurors 8H, 20J, and 28K, would be sufficient and would 
not violate rule 606(b).4 
Moreover, a rule that does not require a showing of actual bias would constitute a 
departure from this Court's approach in cases where a juror did not honestly answer a 
question in voir dire. This Court has adopted the two-part test articulated in McDonough 
Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548,104 S.Ct. 845 (1984), for determining 
whether a new trial is warranted where a juror failed to answer questions honestly during 
4
 See Addendum A (Graphic Summarizing Voir Dire) 
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voir dire. State v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243 (Utah 1992). Under that test, the defendant is 
entitled to a new trial "if the moving party demonstrates that (1) 'a juror failed to answer 
honestly a material question on voir dire/ and (2) 'a correct response would have provided a 
valid basis for a challenge for cause."5 Id. at 245 (quotingMcDonough, 464 U.S. at 556,104 
S.Ct. at 850). 
To determine whether the McDonough two-prong test has been met, this Court 
requires an evidentiary hearing by the trial court. See Thomas, 111 P.2d at 451 (remanding 
to trial court for evidentiary hearing); State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22, f, 20 P.3d 888 (trial court 
holding evidentiary hearing on McDonough claim). In Thomas one juror failed to disclose 
that she had been the victim of a sexual assault and another juror failed to disclose that her 
child had been sexually abused. Thomas, 111 P.2d at 450. In Evans, a juror failed to 
disclose that her uncle was the chief deputy in the prosecutor's office. Evans, 2001 UT 22, ^ f 
24. In both cases, disclosure during voir dire would have likely triggered the remove-or-
rehabilitate rule. Nevertheless, neither disclosure was sufficient to require a new trial under 
McDonough. Defendants must establish actual bias. See Evans, 2001 UT 22, \ 28 (finding 
juror impartial after reviewing testimony regarding extent of relationship). 
* * * 
In sum, the policy considerations for requiring removal or rehabilitation of a 
potentially biased juror that is challenged during voir dire do not apply to such a juror who is 
expressly passed for cause. In the former case, any concern of bias can be easily addressed 
by removing the juror and replacing him or her with a juror whose impartiality is not in 
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doubt. In the latter case, such a remedy is not available. As a general rule, this Court 
requires a showing of actual bias on a claim of juror bias. This case should be no different. 
An evidentiary hearing would reveal whether the two jurors' experiences were such as to 
create "light impressions" or impressions which are "strong and deep" and which will affect 
the jurors' impartiality. Cobb, 11A P.2d at 1126-27. Such a requirement is consistent with 
this Court's jurisprudence under the McDonough test. 
E. DEFENDANT HAS NOT ESTABLISHED PLAIN ERROR OR INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
Defendant contends that even if the court of appeals incorrectly applied the abuse of 
discretion standard, this Court should nevertheless affirm under plain error or ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Resp. Brf. at 14. This argument fails. 
1. Plain Error Cannot Be Found Where No Case Law Has Applied the 
Remove-or-Rehabilitate Rule to Unpreserved Challenges and Where 
Defense Counsel Affirmatively Waived Any Alleged Error. 
Defendant contends that the trial court's failure to sua sponte remove the two jurors 
was obvious error because, he alleges, the law is well-established that where voir dire reveals 
"jurors with experiences relating to crimes similar to those being adjudicated," trial courts 
are "require[d]... to remove the jurors for cause or to conduct in-depth voir dire rebutting 
their presumptive bias . . . . " Resp. Brf. at 15. This claim fails for two reasons. 
First, as discussed above, the remove-or-rehabilitate rule has heretofore only been 
applied where there has been a challenge to the juror during voir dire. It has not been applied 
in a case, like here, where the jurors are passed for cause. Accordingly, any error could not 
be obvious. State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, \ 16, 95 P.3d 276 (holding that to establish plain 
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error, defendant is required to "show that the law governing the error was clear at the time 
the alleged error was made"). And second, as discussed in the opening brief, defendant 
cannot claim plain error where he affirmatively waived any challenge, or invited the error. 
See State v. Moton, 749 P.2d 639,642 (Utah 1988); State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d 81, 83 (Utah 
1988) ("hold[ing] that DeMille's failure to voir dire the jurors on [child abuse or biases about 
defendant harming a child even though he had opportunity to do so] constitutes a waiver and 
bars inquiry into the bias question"). 
2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Cannot be Found Where There 
Has Been No Showing of Actual Prejudice. 
Defendant contends that this Court should, in any event, affirm on the ground that his 
trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective. Resp. Brf. at 18-23. To prevail on a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show that (1) counsel's performance was 
deficient, and (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). He can establish neither. 
Defendant claims that counsel was deficient because he did not challenge the two 
jurors for cause. Resp. Brf. at 21-22. However, both jurors assured the court that their 
experience with sexual abuse would not affect their ability to be impartial. Counsel was 
present during the examination and it should therefore be assumed that based on the jurors' 
demeanor, counsel concluded that their responses were genuine. See id at 690,104 S.Ct. at 
206 (holding that "counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance"). 
As to part two of the Strickland analysis, defendant acknowledges that his "[c]ounsel 
did not know if jurors [2F] and [ 181] were actual victims of child sexual abuse or relatives or 
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friends of victims." Resp. Brf. at 21. Defendant nevertheless argues that the possibility of 
juror bias based on their unknown experience with sexual abuse is sufficient to establish 
prejudice. Resp. Brf. at 22-23. This argument is incorrect. As with plain error, "[t]o 
maintain a[n] [ineffectiveness] claim that a biased juror prejudiced him,... [defendant] must 
show that the juror was actually biased against him." Goeders v. Hundley, 59 F.3d 73, 75 
(8th Cir. 1995). As discussed above, defendant has failed to make that showing. 
Defendant nevertheless argues that to the extent that the factual details of the jurors' 
legal bias are not in the record to further establish prejudice, this is attributable to the trial 
court's inadequate voir dire, an independent basis for reversal." Resp. Brf. at 23. This claim 
lacks merit. Under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, "[a] party to an appeal in a 
criminal case may move the court to remand the case to the trial court for entry of findings of 
fact, necessary for the appellate court's determination of a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel." Utah R. App. P. 23B(a). Defendant thus had an opportunity to seek an evidentiary 
hearing on the issue, but failed to do so. Accordingly, his ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim must fail. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons and those stated in the opening brief, the State respectfully 
requests the Court to reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
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